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Summary of Workshop to Review an
OMB Report on Regulatory Risk
Assessment and Management*
John S. Evans, John D. Graham, George M. Gray,
Adrienne Hollis, Barry Ryan, Andrew Smith,
Mark Smith and Alison Taylor**
Introduction
On March 6 and 7, 1991, an invitational workshop was conducted
in Boston to peer review the 1990 Office of Management and Budget
report, CURRENT REGULATORY ISSUES IN RISK ASSESSMENT AND
RISK MANAGEMENT IN REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT, APRIL 1, 1990 - MARCH 31, 1991 (OMB
Report or Report). The Report was written by several economists who
have had significant experience reviewing proposed and final rules
issued by federal regulatory agencies, and the purpose of the Workshop
* The workshop was funded and organized by the Center for Risk Analysis of the
Harvard School of Public Health. A full report containing several appendices,
including a list of invited panelists and participants is available from the Center.
The authors express special thanks to the invited experts and participants for a
stimulating and memorable experience. The moderator, Dr. Paul Deisler, did a fine
job of guiding the discussion in productive ways while giving each person adequate
time to articulate his or her point of view.
They also appreciate helpful comments on the summary from Sarah Spedden,
Doctoral Candidate, Department of Environmental Health.
** Each author is affiliated with the Center for Risk Analysis. Dr. Evans is
Associate Professor of Environmental Health; Dr. Graham, Associate Professor of
Policy and Decision Sciences; Dr. Gray, Postdoctoral Fellow in Environmental
Science and Public Policy; Dr. Hollis, Postdoctoral Fellow in Environmental
Science and Public Policy; Dr. Ryan, Associate Professor of Environmental Health;
Mr. A. Smith, Doctoral Candidate in Environmental Health; Dr. M. Smith,
Postdoctoral Fellow in Environmental Science and Public Policy, and Ms. Taylor,
Doctoral Candidate in Environmental Health.
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was to subject it to rigorous scrutiny by experts in the fields of risk
assessment and management.
The OMB Report is significant because the views expressed therein
represent the official position of the Executive Office of the President.
Although the Report was the subject of internal editorial review, it was
not peer reviewed prior to publication and was produced without
significant consultation with scientists and risk assessors in academia or
the federal government. Much of the Report was based on criticisms of
agency practice that have appeared previously in both published
literature and regulatory proceedings.
The Workshop included a panel of 15 invited experts and 35
additional participants who expressed an interest. 1 Each invited expert
was asked to critique a particular portion of the OMB Report. The range
of disciplines and affiliations represented gave rise to a rich diversity of
viewpoints expressed during two days of discussion. Key OMB staff
also participated.
The following summarizes the result of deliberations and highlights
the discussion of specific topics. Although it was reviewed by invited
Workshop panelists and participants, this is not a consensus document.
Indeed, the Workshop was designed to elicit a range of views.
Workshop Summary
Risk managers at federal regulatory agencies are seeking to achieve
multiple objectives. They include:
* protection of public health from widespread exposure
to toxic agents;
- protection of highly exposed and/or sensitive groups
from toxic agents on the basis of equity or fairness, even
when exposure is not widespread;
1 Invited panelists were: Melvin Anderson, Paul Anderson, Michael Baram,
Barbara Beck, Maureen Cropper, W. Gary Flamm, Dale Hattis, Thomas Hopkins,
Paul Lioy, Thomas McKone, Franklin Mirer, Colin Park, Robert Sielken, Thomas
Walton, and Lauren Zeise. Their affiliations and the names and affiliation of other
participants appear in Appendix A of the full report mentioned above.
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- protection of the natural environment and ecosystems
from the adverse effects of toxic agents on behalf of both
current and future generations;
- responsiveness to public concerns about human health
and environmental risks, even when risk assessors are
skeptical about the magnitude of the risks posed by toxic
agents; and
* economic efficiency by adopting protective regulations
when the marginal social benefits of risk management exceed
the marginal social costs of risk management (at least where
an agency's legislative mandate does not prohibit
consideration of economics).
An adversarial relationship between OMB and the federal regulatory
agencies has developed over the years, in part because it is usually
impossible to achieve all of these objectives simultaneously. The parties
in this adversarial relationship appear to assign differing degrees of
importance to the achievement of the various regulatory objectives.
Given the different objectives, it should be expected that OMB and the
agencies might have different ideas about what is a good risk
assessment and what is a good risk management decision.
Several types of risk management decisions are made by the
government. At the broadest level, the federal government decides,
through a political process involving Congress, the executive branch,
and interest groups, how much money and staff will be available at each
federal agency to engage in risk management activities. Within each
federal agency, decisions are also made about how much money and
staff will be allocated to specific risk management programs. Although
these resource allocation decisions are of critical national importance,
they are not always recognized explicitly as risk management decisions.
Within a particular agency, decisions are made about what rules
should be issued and how they should be written. Federal rules address
diverse matters such as exposure limits for toxic chemicals in the
workplace, tolerance levels for food additives, permissible levels of
contaminants in drinking water, and cleanup standards for hazardous
waste sites. In addition to national rules, critical decisions are made by
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regional, state, and local regulatory officials. Cleanup decisions at each
hazardous waste site, for example, are made on the basis of feasibility
studies, risk assessments, and guidelines established by Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) headquarters and regional offices.
Federal rules are adopted based on legislative mandates that provide
risk managers with varying degrees of discretion. When discretion is
restricted, it may reflect congressional determination to achieve specific
regulatory objectives. Some statues (e.g. the Toxic Substances Control
Act) authorize risk managers to weigh the risks, costs, and benefits of
alternative courses of action - even though such factors are not always
considered. Other statutes (e.g., the famous Delaney Clause covering
carcinogenic food additives and the National Primary Ambient Air
Quality Standards under the Clean air Act) compel the federal
government to base decisions exclusively on health considerations. Still
other statutes order risk managers to reduce human health risk to the
maximum extent that is technically and economically feasible (e.g., the
permissible exposure limits designed to protect worker health under the
Occupational Safety and Health Act).
Although regulatory statutes differ markedly, they rarely specify
how agencies are to perform risk assessments of human exposures to
potentially harmful agents. Risk assessment practice has therefore
evolved at federal agencies and become routinized through informal and
formal agency guidelines. While statutory mandates and risk assessment
practices differ among agencies, the various regulatory cultures share a
common policy viewpoint; that risk managers should err on the side of
safety when making regulatory decisions in the face of scientific
uncertainty.
OMB's Role
Within this complex administrative process, OMB requires each
federal agency to prepare regulatory impact analyses. Working as an
agent of the President, it sees the regulatory review process as a device
to assure some degree of analytic rigor and economic efficiency in the
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rulemaking activities of federal agencies. OMB has taken an increasing
interest in the technical and policy aspects or risk assessment because
risk assessment plays a critical role in rulemaking activities.
White House review of regulatory proposals has been a significant
function of the Executive Office of the President since the Ford
Administration. Both Democratic and Republican Presidents have seen
value in OMB regulatory review, even though such reviews inevitably
create an adversarial relationship between regulatory agencies and the
Executive Office of the President. While some observers see OMB's
regulatory review function as critical to a President's ability to carry out
his Constitutional responsibilities and achieve economic and social
objectives, others see OMB review as a pernicious barrier to the
achievement of the human health and environmental objectives
established by the U.S. Congress. Hence, disputes about OMB's role
reflect the tensions between Congressional and Presidential authority.
Risk Assessment as a Regulatory Tool
Risk assessment is an analytic tool rather than an end in itself. Since
the tool is used for a wide variety of risk management decisions, it is
critical that risk assessors and managers forge a constructive
collaboration. Risk assessments should address the needs of risk
managers in a rigorous, objective, and timely fashion. Some
assessments need to be more refined than others, depending on the
importance of the decision.
For chemicals that are known or suspected to cause cancer, federal
agencies have adopted standard risk assessment procedures. Specific
"default" assumptions are considered appropriate when data are
insufficient to complete an assessment. The default assumptions are
designed to err on the side of safety in the absence of scientific
knowledge. In contrast to more refined risk assessments, these standard
assessments do not require extensive case-specific data.
Despite their scientific limitations, standard risk assessments of
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carcinogens are a useful screening tool (i.e., they help identify potential
problems and indicate exposures that are not worthy of further concern).
They may also provide a basis for regulatory decisions in cases where
risks are potentially significant and the estimated costs of risk reduction
are too small to justify a more refined risk assessment.
Refined risk assessments should be tailored to the needs of risk
managers as the stakes in risk management decisions increase. Federal
agencies are striving to develop refined health risk estimates for human
exposures to those chemicals (e.g., benzene, dioxin, and formaldehyde)
that cannot be eliminated without imposing substantial economic
burdens. Refined risk assessments can be especially helpful when
pertinent data are available to replace some of the default assumptions
used in standard risk assessment
Risk managers are often faced with the difficult questions of
whether to regulate carcinogens on the basis of a standard risk
assessment or await a more refined risk assessment. One of the dangers
of excessive reliance on refined risk assessments is that regulatory
paralysis can result as regulators await additional data. Interestingly,
EPA has recently decided to refine its risk assessment of dioxin. In the
interim, EPA has decided to continue its current regulatory programs
that are designed to reduce human exposure to dioxin.
Congress and federal agencies are now considering new approaches
to risk assessment. Dr. Bernard Goldstein is chairing the Committee on
Risk Assessment Methodology of the National Academy of Sciences
(NAS), which is looking into ways to improve the risk assessment
process. Another NAS Committee on risk assessment is being formed
in response to the mandates of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.
The President's Science Advisor, Dr. D. Allan Bromley, has launched
an interagency committee to explore improvements in risk assessment
practice while several federal agencies have internal groups working
toward the same goal. The EPA is considering revision of its risk
assessment guidelines and the EPA Science Advisory Board recently
expressed its intent to offer comments aimed at accelerating EPA's
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review of the guidelines. Hearings on risk assessment were recently
held by a subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives, which is*
another indication of the growing interest in reform of the risk
assessment practices.
OMB's Major Observations
The three major observations in the OMB Report are quoted below:
1. The continued reliance on conservative (worst-case)
assumptions (by federal agencies) distorts risk assessment,
yielding estimates that may overstate likely risks by several
orders of magnitude.
2. Conservative biases embedded in risk assessment
impart a substantial "margin of safety." The choice of an
appropriate margin of safety should remain the province of
responsible risk-management officials, and should not be
preempted through biased risk assessment.
3. Conservatism in risk assessment distorts the
regulatory priorities of the Federal Government, directing
societal resources to reduce what are often trivial
carcinogenic risks while failing to address more substantial
threats to life and health.
Strengths of the OMB Report
The Workshop discussion indicated that the OMB Report correctly
identified some important deficiencies in the risk assessment practices of
federal regulatory agencies.
1. Federal agencies do not adequately communicate the scientific
uncertainties in the cancer risk estimates that are used to justify
regulatory decisions. While many actors in the regulatory process
recognize the uncertainties in cancer risk assessment, others are not
aware of these uncertainties. By neglecting to characterize these
uncertainties, federal agencies provide a misleading picture (i.e., false
precision) of what is known about cancer risk to regulators, journalists,
Congress, and the American people. Key policy judgments about the
treatment of uncertainty are often embedded in the risk assessment itself
rather than being presented for resolution to the accountable regulatory
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officials.
2. The cancer risk estimates reported by federal agencies, while
often based on uniform assumptions and procedures, contain hidden
and nonuniform margins of safety. For example, the use of the
linearized multistage model for low-dose extrapolation may generate risk
estimates which are more protective for some chemicals than others.
These inconsistencies arise because the default procedures are
scientifically more appropriate for some chemical carcinogens than for
others. While in some cases scientists have clues about these
inconsistencies, in other cases scientists do not know which chemicals
are the best candidates for departing from standard procedures.
3. Deficiencies in cancer risk assessment may distort the regulatory
priorities of the federal government. For example, if standard risk
assessments for carcinogens are more protective than those for various
noncancer health and safety effects, then they induce the nation to
devote too many resources to the control of exposure to selected
chemical carcinogens and too few resources to other health problems.
Priorities among chemical carcinogens may also be misordered since
standard cancer risk estimates are less protective for some carcinogens
than for others.
In light of these observations, the OMB Report has raised a red flag
about whether America's scarce resources for public health and safety
protection are being allocated in the best way.
Weaknesses of the OMB Report
The Workshop discussion exposed several important deficiencies in
the OMB Report that should be acknowledged.
1. The OMB Report neglected to mention a variety of factors that
may cause cancer risks to be underestimated and underregulated. By
neglecting to mention these factors, the OMB Report provides an
incomplete and imbalanced account of the biases and scientific
uncertainties in risk assessment. The regulation of carcinogens is
severely limited by the amount of laboratory animal data and
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epidemiology. Numerous compounds in widespread use have not been
adequately tested for carcinogenicity, even though short-term tests and
other data may suggest cause for concern. OMB neglected to note that
some carcinogenic agents are underregulated simply because they have
not been adequately tested.
2. In its discussion of the biological and statistical issues in risk
assessment, the OMB Report makes several misleading and incorrect
statements. While these problems are not always highly significant, their
cumulative impact is to lessen the scientific quality of the Report. Such
errors may have been avoided if the document had been peer reviewed
prior to publication. Readers should consult more authoritative
references on the key issues in risk assessment.2
3. The major findings of the OMB Report are not based on a
systematic review of a random sample of agency risk assessments and
regulations. Instead, the Report cites selected examples of agency
practice in an ad hoc fashion to buttress its main points. Workshop
participants noted several examples where agency practice was different
from the impression given in the OMB Report. Some federal agencies
and programs appear to have done a better job than others at the difficult
tasks of expressing scientific uncertainty and incorporating new
scientific information into risk estimates. Workshop participants noted
that the federal government has several efforts underway to improve the
risk assessment process.
4. The OMB Report would have been stronger if it had contained a
comprehensive set of recommendations to correct the deficiencies that
were identified. OMB does urge more quantification of uncertainty and
greater use of expected values in cancer risk management. The Report
does not, however, recommend specific scientific research programs to
reduce uncertainties. Nor does OMB recommend programs to develop
credible methods for quantifying uncertainty and calculating expected
values of risk. More importantly, the OMB Report does not highlight
2 See, e.g., Appendix B of the full report.
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the specific public health and safety risks that have been neglected due to
the alleged distortion of priorities in favor of cancer risk management.
Future Directions
In the process of peer reviewing the OMB Report, Workshop
participants proposed a variety of steps that might be taken in the future
to improve risk assessment and management. Although the Workshop
did not attempt to achieve consensus on appropriate steps, they are
summarized here for consideration by readers.
- Reporting risk distributions. When risk management decisions are
important enough to justify refined risk assessment, analysts should
avoid the "tyranny of the single number" by reporting more complete
"risk distributions." In some cases numerical distributions may simply
reflect scientific uncertainty while in other cases they may reflect known
variability in human exposures or sensitivity to toxic agents. These two
kinds of distributions should be distinguished and reported separately.
When scientists are unsure about the extent of human exposure or
the shape of dose-response curves at low doses, probability
distributions should be employed to indicate the extent of uncertainty,
thereby taking into account sources of possible conservatism and
nonconservatism. The reporting of probability distributions over risk
would minimize the hidden policy judgments in risk assessment while
forcing risk managers to make explicit policy judgments about what
margins of safety are appropriate in risk management. Distributions that
highlight uncertainty can also build the case for more scientific research
and data collection to reduce uncertainty.
Numerical risk distributions can also be used to elucidate variability
in human exposure and sensitivity to toxic agents. Historically, many
cancer risk assessments have focused solely on a hypothetical
maximally exposed individual. Risk managers should be informed about
the full range of human exposures and sensitivities unless there is a
compelling policy reason to do otherwise.
In the short run, reporting risk distributions may complicate the
Evans et al.: Review of OMB Report 81
tasks of risk managers because it is easier to base decisions on
protective point estimates - especially when the manager's political
mandate calls for conservatism in regulatory choice. In the long run,
however, numerical risk distributions will better inform everyone about
what is at stake in these decisions and thus facilitate more informed
political deliberations.
An important limitation of risk distributions is that subjective
scientific judgments will be required to quantify at least some of the
critical input values and uncertainties (e.g., the shape of the distributions
of uncertain biological quantities). Often data will not exist to verify or
refute these subjective judgments. There may be situations where
subjective judgments are too speculative or polarized to report credible
risk distributions. In cases where risk distributions are reported, risk
managers and journalists will require training to interpret these
distributions properly. Federal agencies have already made some
important steps forward in this direction.
- Strategic program of research and data collection. The U.S.
should consider implementing an expanded, strategic program of
research and data collection to identify and, where possible, reduce
uncertainties in risk assessment. A strategic program would focus
research resources on the assumptions in risk assessment that have the
biggest impact on uncertainty and are resolvable through research and
data collection. In the short run, significant payoffs may result from
increased application of modem techniques of exposure assessment. In
the longer run, an expanded research program on the biological
underpinnings of cancer risk assessment is promising. In order to
multiply resources and improve the credibility of research, both
government and industry should consider making expanded research
investment
* Criteria for departing from default assumptions. Federal agencies
should consider adopting a more explicit process for the acceptance of
new types of data in risk assessment because some new data are more
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relevant and valid than others. While current agency guidelines permit
departure from default assumptions when warranted by improved
science, criteria have not been developed to assess when new
information is reliable enough to replace standard assumptions.
It may be easier for agencies to utilize the best science if risk
estimates are reported as probability distributions, since probability
distributions can be adjusted by scientists to reflect degrees of
confidence in new scientific findings. The process of departing from
default assumptions should allow for extensive public and scientific
comment.
- Noncancer risk assessment. The development of risk assessment
methods for noncancer endpoints (e.g., neurological effects and aquatic
effects) is critical to making sound regulatory decisions. Reporting
noncancer risk estimates may also make it easier for certain cancer risk
estimates to be revised downward when new scientific evidence is
reassuring. As long as risk managers are presented only cancer risk
estimates, there may be a tendency for risk assessors - consciously or
subconsciously - to retain certain conservative assumptions in cancer
risk assessment in order to capture concerns about other environmental
damages and human health effects.
- Scrutinize the estimated costs of risk management. In conjunction
with efforts to improve estimates of regulatory benefits due to reduced
cancer risk, OMB and federal agencies should also consider uncertainty
in the estimated costs of risk management decisions. Although some
attempts have been made to quantify the total costs of environmental
regulation, less information is available on the specific costs of
regulations designed to reduce cancer risk from chemical exposure.
More serious consideration of the indirect economic benefits of
environmental regulation is also required.
Risk managers also need to know whether the projected costs of
regulatory compliance, made at the point of a regulatory decision, are
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unbiased estimates of the actual costs of compliance incurred several
years after the implementation of a rule. Legitimate concerns have been
raised about deliberate overestimation and underestimation of regulatory
costs. The scrutiny of regulatory costs should extend beyond simple
compliance costs and include indirect consequences (both positive and
negative) for the productivity, degree of innovation, and
competitiveness of American industry.
- Improve risk communication. Efforts to improve risk assessment
and management should be undertaken with recognition of the daunting
challenge of effective risk communication. More refined risk
assessments may make it more difficult for risk assessors and managers
to communicate risk estimates to nontechnical audiences. At the same
time, more effort needs to be made to understand the concerns of
communities that may be at risk because of their proximity to hazardous
facilities and to make sure that they are addressed by risk assessors and
managers. These communities are often populated by poor and minority
groups. 2
3 The OMB Report and Workshop discussion identified significant flaws in the
federal government's approach to risk assessment and management. Although such
flaws were apparent, solutions are not so easy to identify. It is time to move beyond
criticisms and begin to propose solutions. The various groups working on
improvement of the risk assessment process may want to consider and further develop
the future directions that were discussed at the Workshop.
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